As Ethereum is one of the most popular blockchains, it is naturally targeted by various attacks, aiming, for example, to disrupt the service or steal tokens. Among these, in deanonymization attacks, an adversary can obtain validator IP addresses and then perform a Denial-of-Service attack on them. To mitigate this attack, the Ethereum foundation is proposing Whisk, a Single Secret Leader Election protocol that uses a zero-knowledge proof called Curdleproofs to prove the validity of a shuffle of validators. One limitation of Curdleproofs is the shuffle size, which must be a power of two, restricting the number of validators that can be included. This paper overcomes this limitation by proposing CAAUrdleproofs, a modified version of Curdleproofs that incorporates Springproofs. Our experiments show that CAAUrdleproofs offers a performance advantage for any shuffle size that is not a power of two and that this advantage increases as the shuffle size decreases below a power of two.
Authors: Anders Malta Jakobsen, Oliver Holmgaard, Daniele Dell’Aglio, Michele Albano
Contributing partner: Aalborg University
